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PREFACE
This Executive Summary provides a synopsis of the final report prepared
under MSC/TRW Task ASPO-92, IIApollo Spacecraft Operational Data Management
System Analysis. 1I During the course of this three-month study, topical
working papers were presented and discussed at bi-weekly MSC/TRW review
meetings. The study final report is based on restructured and clarified
versions of these papers. Since this Summary and the Final Report have
differing orders of content, the Summary text provides references to that
Report to facilitate quests for greater detail.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Task ASPO-92 was to study Apollo, Skylab and several
other data management systems to learn what techniques can be applied to
the management of operational data for future manned spacecraft programs.
Operational data is defined as:
"Data which describe spacecraft and spacecraft
subsystems performance capabilities and limita-
tions, and which are required to accomplish mis-
sion planning, analysis, and/or real time support."
The study was performed by: 1) analyzing present data management systems,
2) developing requirements for future operational data management systems,
3) ~valuating automated data management techniques, and 4) preparing a plan
for data management applicable to future space programs. As this study
progressed, it became increasingly evident that cost-effective management
of spacecraft operational data must include consideration of other techni-
cal data such as test results, configuration control, and reliability. The
interplay between data sources, data users, and program time phasing pro-
duces a situation where operational data can be made largely a by-product
of other data-producing activities of the program. Furthermore, the pro-
cesses which produce the purely technical data are also potential generators
of management data required for program visibility and decision-making. It
was concluded that a cost-effective approach to operational data lay in the
direction of an integrated data base containing at least the technical and
management information of the program.
This conclusion is reflected in the plan recommended for future programs,
a plan based on the potential utility to MSC of a center-wide Information
Management System (IMS) serving all Center Groups. The IMS would be user
oriented, have several coordinated elements, and function as a service. The
user determines how he will apply the IMS to his needs and what data he will
manage. One element of the system would promote commonality, set standards,
establish procedures, encourage compatibility among users, and provide user
training in the IMS application. Other elements would provide computer-based
data processing functions and those functions not feasible for automation.
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2. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
2.1 APOLLO AND SKYLAB
2.1.1 System Description. The Apollo Operational Data Management System
(OMS) began in 1965, when the need for a single authoritative source for
spacecraft operational data was recognized by the Apollo Spacecraft Program
Office and the Mission Planning and Analysis Division. Since then the
system has evolved to meet the needs of the Apollo Program as it progressed
through the mission planning and operational phases. The present Apollo
system produces the Spacecraft Operational Data Book (SODB) which is a
seven-volume Class I document, and also provides additional data as re-
quired by the many individual data users. While this system uses a com-
puter to perform certain calculations, it is considered to be a manual
system because all major activities are performed manually, and data are
handled, formatted, and published manually. Skylab activities began two
years later than Apollo with an Operational OMS similar to that of
Apollo. Skylab operational data are published in a five-volume Operational
Data Book (ODB). A simplified flow diagram and description of the Apollo
and Skylab Operational Data Management Systems are presented in Figure 1.
Detailed flow diagrams and descriptions are contained in Appendix A of the
Final Report, and the contents of both the SODB and the ODB are described
in Appendix D.
While the Apollo and Skylab DMS's are similar, two factors necessi-
tated study of both systems, viz.;
1) The Skylab system was structured to avoid some early Apollo
system problems. An assessment of the effectiveness of
these changes is required.
2) The Skylab system involves two NASA field centers (while the
Apollo system is captive to MSC) and is more representative of the
future situation with multi-center data management functions.
2.1.2 Problems Experienced. The management objective of the Apollo
and Skylab spacecraft operational data systems has been simple: to obtain
and provide accurate spacecraft data in a timely fashion to satisfy the
2
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OPERATIONAL DATA FLOW DESCRIPTION
The basic functional flow as shown above is representative of both the
Apollo and Skylab Operational Data Management Systems. The basic functions
are as follows:
1. In fulfillment of MSC data requirements, data are submitted by
the responsible contractor (or NASA) to MSC for incorporation
in the SOOB or OOB.
2. Oata submitted by NASA or contractors are evaluated for incorpor-
ation in the SOOB or OOB.
3. If the data are approved by the contractor and/or Program Office,
the data are given to the NASA SSM for evaluation and validation.
4. If the data are not approved for SOOB-ODB incorporation by the
contractor and/or Program Office, an attempt is made to resolve
discrepancies and delete inappropriate data; without resolution,
the data are published as a NASA Oata Source (without contractor
concurrence) .
5. After data approval by the SSM, MSC approves, formats, publishes
and distributes the data to the designated standard and special
users.
6. As the user identifies more data requirements to satisfy his
planning needs, he submits data requirements to the Program
Office. The Program Office evaluates the requirements versus
the need to obtain these additional data at no additional costs
or added costs (as the case may be).
7. If these data requirements are approved, the data requirements
are imposed on the appropriate data supplier who will prepare
data submittals and forward them (as described in 1. above) to
MSC.
Figure 1. SODB-ODB Basic Data Flow
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requirements of the large data user community. However, implementation to
accomplish this objective in the real world has been more complex. Some
of this complexity is caused by the need to define data requirements con-
current with design of the techniques for use of the data, e.g., software
modeling, and the need to use data prior to development of the spacecraft
systems which the data must characterize. During the early planning phase
of Apollo, this resulted in vague definitions of requirements by the users
and a reluctance to estimate data values by the data suppliers. When data
was obtained, the MSC subsystem managers did not effectively respond in
their validation role. In general, many of the participants in the data
management system were uncertain about the purpose and authority of the
data and its relationship to other data in the program. The presence of
redundant data in the many technical documents of the program served to
nurture this uncertainty. As time passed, program problems occurred which
were attributable to data deficiencies; therefore, management involvement
increased. Simultaneously, the coordinating efforts of the data management
group of ASPO were causing an awareness of the data management objectives to
permeate throughout MSC. By the time the operational phase of Apollo was
reached, these occurrences had coupled with the increased knowledge of both
data requirements and data values to yield a widely recognized and supported
spacecraft operational OMS.
However, at this point the cost was high, for large sets of previously
unplanned data requirements began to unfold and were imposed on the data
suppliers (mostly Apollo contractors). This resulted in costly add-ons
to contracts, with schedules for fulfillment of these requirements, and
even some of the requirements severely compromised to maintain reasonable
costs. More harmful instances occurred when the opportunity to acquire
critical data was missed and the data were sUbsequently irretrievable.
At present, schedules for some key data are uncontrolled, resulting in
the submittal of large masses of data so close to Apollo launch dates as
to severely compromise the value of the data.
The growing pains experienced by MSC on Apollo have been alleviated
somewhat on Skylab. Lessons learned from Apollo caused greater awareness
of operational data requirements and acceptance of the operational data
4
management concept throughout MSC at earlier stages of program development.
However, there are problems similar in nature to previous Apollo problems:
1) there are redundant and conflicting data among documents from which
operational data are derived; 2) the data validation role, while improved
over Apollo, leaves much to be desired in terms of response priority; and
3) there are uncertainties among some of the OMS participants about their
responsibilities. These problems serve to impede the timely fulfillment
of data requirements.
During the course of this study, both users and va1idators of Apollo
and Sky1ab data were surveyed to determine their attitude about the Opera-
tional DMS and their involvement with the system, and to solicit recommenda-
tions for improvements applicable to operational data management for future
spacecraft programs. Surveys were conducted with TRW, MSC, and MSFC per-
sonne1. The TRW survey was performed first and served as a basis for re-
finement of the survey technique prior to surveying MSC and MSFC. The
results of these surveys are presented in Appendix C of the Final Report.
A summary of survey results, presented in Table 1, serves to substantiate
the above discussion of Apollo and Skylab Operational Data Management
problems encountered at MSC.
The MSFC survey results summarized in Table 1 were based on interviews
with seven data users and seven data va1idators during a one-day meeting,
and because of this small sample, may not reflect the general attitude of
MSFC. However, the results suggest a situation at MSFC which is similar
to the situation of uncertainty which prevailed at MSC during the early days
of Apollo. While the MSFC data management personnel present during these
interviews were attuned to the goals of the operational OMS, the data users
were uncertain about the purpose, content, and authority of the OOB. In
reality, they are probably not users, for they appear to circumvent the
intent of the ODS by fulfilling their data requirements through contact
with whomever they believe to be a reliable source. The MSFC va1idators
appear to take their validation role seriously, but do not appear to use
the OOB as a reliable source of data.
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2.1.3 Conclusions. The problems experienced by MSC with Apollo and Skylab
Spacecraft Operational Data Management Systems led to some significant
conclusions about those factors which contributed to a successful system,
and those factors which adversely affected success.
1) Program office and user management emphasis and conscientious
data management group activities have resulted in widespread user
acceptance of the "single authoritative data source concept."
2) In general, line management emphasis on the validation role is
insufficient, which adversely affects the timeliness of data.
3) The complexities of handling and updating large quantities of
paper serve to inhibit the smooth and timely flow of data.
4) The definition of data requirements subsequent to the early
planning stages of a program results in costly contract additions,
and compromised fulfillment of data requirements.
Based entirely on the small sample size survey conducted at MSFC, the
situation appears similar to the situation at MSC four years ago, viz.;
1) The relationships and purposes of program documentation are
unknown by those expected to use the documentation.
2) Except for establishment of an MSFC data management group, high-
level management emphasis on participation in the Skylab Opera-
tional Data Management System appears lacking.
2.1.4 Recommendations for Apollo and Skylab Improvements. While the
primary orientation of this study is focused on recommendations applicable
to future manned programs, the study results indicate that some improve-
ments to the current Apollo and Skylab operational OMS's would be cost-
effective. The following actions are recommended to facilitate these
improvements.
1) The advantages of single authoritative data sources between
centers, and the need to identify these sources should be dis-
cussed with MSFC management.
2) Firm and realistic schedules for submittal of contractor supplied
data to MSC should continue to be pursued by the Program Offices.
3) Greater emphasis should be placed on the timely validation and
supply of data by line management, and alternate validation
authorities should be designated.
7
4) Requirements should be established for suppliers to submit data
changes as soon as the data becomes available, and to assess all
hardware and redline changes, and ground and flight test results
for operational data impacts.
5) The roles and responsibilities of all Skylab data management
participants should be explicitly defined.
6) The SODB should be printed at one facility only and high priority
should be given to printing and distribution.
2.2 DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OTHER THAN APOLLO AND SKYLAB
The Titan II and Minuteman (Ballistic Missiles), Cheyenne (Helicopter),
and Kentucky (State Government) Integrated Data Management Systems were
studied to determine characteristics which could be applied to enhance
effective management of data for future manned spacecraft programs. These
are systems with which TRW has been associated and with which the study
team is familiar. Descriptions of these systems are provided in Appendix
B of the Final Report. Significant characteristics of these systems are
presented in the following paragraphs.
2.2.1 Titan II and Minuteman. Early integrated planning of technical data
needs was an important contributing factor to program success, as well as
to data management system success. Contractually imposed specifications
called for program-wide functional analyses which were sensitive to the
definition of specific data requirements. The data then evolved from
more detailed analysis efforts to fulfill these requirements. It is
interesting to note that throughout the duration of the program, functional
analysis data were used effectively as a systems integration tool.
In Minuteman, the responsibility for both the end item specifications
and operational performance estimates were consolidated within the same
personnel groups. Similar consolidation of data validation responsibili-
-ties has occurred during the management of the Skylab and Apollo operational
data and is desirable for future programs.
2.2.2 Cheyenne. An early study of program data requirements by the
Cheyenne Program Manager resulted in the development of the Integrated
Technical Data System (ITDS) and is believed to be the primary factor
leading to widespread acceptance by program personnel. ITDS was organized
8
as an integrated data system for management of all program data. The system
was considered very effective in assisting the management of the program.
2.2.3 Kentucky. The Kentucky Data Management System was patterned after
ITDS and reflects a modularized information management system approach which
is planned to eventually handle most of the state government's data. It
is presently used to manage Highway Department, State Finance, Personnel,
and Executive Office data. The personal involvement of the Governor of
Kentucky is credited with achieving ready acceptance by the many partici-
pants.
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3. REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONAL
DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The requirements necessary to develop an effective future spacecraft
operational Data Management System (OMS) were based on results of the
analyses described in Section 2. The complete set of requirements (sub-
divided to group management policy, system implementation, and operational
data requirements) is presented in Section 2 of the Final Report. The
content of this Executive Summary is confined to a discussion of only
those requirements which deserve to receive high-level management attention.
The development and subsequent ratification of an operational data
policy required a long time to evolve on Apollo and was accompanied by
costly implementation. A key lesson from Apollo is the need for early
committment by senior management to a specific policy concerning an opera-
tional OMS.
It is recommended that management endorse the following requirements
for future operational OMS's, and that these requirements be reflected in
policy direction to all participants.
1) The operational OMS shall be a subset of a total planned Technical
Data Management System for the program. This requirement would
assure early planning of the primary data needs of a program, and
would facilitate four important contributions to cost-effective-
ness:
a) It would foster a planned relationship between operational
data and the many technical functions from which it is derived,
e.g., specification development and qualification testing.
This would cause operational data requirements to be coupled
with the other data requirements related to each function.
b) It would enhance a clear definition of authoritative program
data. This would preserve the concept of a single authori-
tative source for spacecraft operational data which is
presently acclaimed, but was painfully achieved for Apollo.
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c) It would, if widely promulgated, provide center-wide visibility
of key program data. This would serve to inhibit the occurrence
of special-purpose redundant data which arises from uncertain-
ties about the content and interrelationships of planned pro-
gram data.
d) It would promote explicit definition of OMS roles, with assign-
ments made in consonance with program need and understood and
accepted throughout the center.
2) The program OMS shall be defined prior to contractor participation
and shall be reflected in all program requests for proposals.
This requirement would cause all prospective contractors to bid
against a known data baseline in a competitive manner and would
result in early familiarity with the required data support
responsibilities and participant roles. It would also serve to
inhibit subsequent add-on costs attributed to bidding uncertainties.
3) The program plans shall enable continual definition, refinement
and evolution of data requirements throughout the program with
minimal contractual effect. This requirement would cause plans
and processes to be developed which would cope with the inherent
inability to completely define all operational data requirements
at the beginning. Solutions are expected to require continuing
interaction between the spacecraft design and development and
mission and operations planning and thus are a part of the system
engineering function.
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4. AN INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR A FUTURE SPACECRAFT PROGRAM
4.1 GENERAL
The analysis of spacecraft operational data in the Apollo program has
exposed two significant and unique characteristics, viz;
1) Operational data can be obtained as a by-product of
activities conducted for other purposes.
2) A time paradox occurs between availability and need.
The first of these characteristics is the basis for the subsequent dis-
cussion while the second is discussed in Section 6.
The user of operational data is not normally associated with the source
of the data. His data requirements are met by activities that are con-
ducted for purposes other than the production of operational data; hence,
operational data can be extracted as a by-product from the "data pools" of
other program activities. In order to alleviate data management problems,
the information required for the management of operational data should be
obtained in a similar way. Thus, both operational data and information
for its management (e.g., status and availability) should be obtained as
an adjunct output of many different program activities. We recommend that
the effective solution for operational data management is an integrated
(and automated) data base for both the technical data and management infor-
mation of a program.
Based on the lessons learned from the study of Apollo and other Infor~
mation Management Systems (IMS), a plan for an IMS for a future spacecraft
program has been developed and is described in Section 1 of the Final Report.
The plan is based on the expectation that MSC will provide a user-oriented
information management service for its operating elements. This service
will take the form of software and hardware configurations which are suit-
able for general purpose data storage and retrieval and are compatible with
integrated data bases. The configuration would be managed by a Center
Data Management Office. The reasons for a center-wide system are to mini-
mize the cost of software, to ensure compatibility of systems among users
and between programs so that data can be readily exchanged, to simplify
training of users, and to coordinate prioritized assignment of computer
12
terminals. Three rules have been adopted to guide the system design:
1) use the MSC functional structure, 2) plan on use of existing MSC hard-
ware and software, and 3) recognize that acceptance of a new information
management approach will take time to evolve and be accepted.
4.2 SYSTEM CONCEPT
The overall system concept is shown in Figure 2. As the figure em-
phasizes, a key to the operation of the system is the existence of a data
base containing the common pool of data for the program. The ready access
to this data by all persons engaged on the program is assured through a
combination of computer terminals and computer-aided access to hard copy
files. By its existence, the data base injects a degree of discipline
into the management of program data that is not possible with fragmented
systems.
A second key to smooth operation of the data base, and thereby the
total IMS, is the existence within the Program Office of several applica-
tions engineers who are knowledgeable of the operation of the total IMS as
well as being de facto representatives of MSC development organizations.
Within the system concept, the applications engineers would be expected to
integrate requirements for operational data with those for other functions.
For example, basic proof-of-performance test data requirements specified
by a subsystem manager would be expanded to include the reporting of out-
of-limits performance data for operational data needs. The applications
engineers would also be the principal interface through which information
would be supplied to the data base. They would develop the file structure
and indexing procedures for the data base and would provide assistance to
users who are not familiar with the mechanics of search and retrieval.
The system depends heavily on automation for its eventual cost-
effectiveness. The Computation and Analysis Division (CAD) of FOD has been
studying software which, together with the 1106/1108 computer complex, could
form the basis for an operational system. This service would be coordi-
nated by the Center Data Management Office (COMO) which would integrate
automation, hard copy, and procedural aspects into a center-wide IMS.
From then on, the COMO would maintain configuration control, and provide
guidance in the use of the IMS to operating elements in the program offices
13
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and functional directorates. The IMS would be user-oriented in that the
using organization would decide how and when to use it, and for what pur-
poses.
4.3 IMPLEMENTATION
The first step of implementation is a crucial one. We recommend that
Center management appoint a policy team to draft and publish a Center
policy concerning a center-wide IMS which provides a user-oriented service.
An IMS planning team headed by the (new) Center Data Manager and composed
of representatives of CAD, program offices, user organizations and several
Data Management Systems engineering specialists, would then work out the
system specifications, designs, and the size and extent of integrated data
bases, and begin training within several months. We also recommend that
the IMS planning team follow the phased-approach (to automation) recommenda-
tions presented in the following section. We believe the system could be
in operation before the Space Shuttle Phase C/O contract is let.
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5. AUTOMATED DATA MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
The contribution of automation techniques to spacecraft operational
data management system effectiveness was analyzed, and an approach believed
to be cost-effective is recommended for future systems. This approach
reflects consideration of the evolving nature of MSC's automation capabili-
ties, the requirements for effective data management, and the characteris-
tics of spacecraft operational data. The scope of this approach was ex-
panded to consider the additional benefits derived from applying the
approach to all the technical data of a program. Detailed discussions of
these topics are presented in Section 3. of the Final Report, and are
briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
While a manual data management system implemented to satisfy the re-
quirements developed during this study would function, there are undersirable
features to certain aspects of such a system - e.g., 1) the overriding
emphasis on paper mechanics detracts from emphasis on data quality, 2) the
time lags associated with paper processing and distribution, and 3) the
complexities of search and update imposed on the user population. Converse-
ly, there are many operations which must be performed manually, such as
the definition and revision of data requirements, the establishment of
validation procedures, and the follow-up on data availability. With the
data itself, there are many items which are simply not good candidates for
computer storage. Thus, during the next decade, any cost-effective system
will undoubtedly be partly automated and partly manual.
Automation alternatives were investigated to determine the extent to
which the above considerations could be accommodated. It was assumed that
present and planned automation capabilities of MSC would be available for
use with operational data. At present there are two major computer com-
plexes at MSC; the Univac 1106/1108 and the IBM-360. An information
retrieval software system and an Exec VIII time share/terminal capability
are expected to be operational on the 1106/1108 in the near future. A
software system to effectively handle and edit large volumes of text materi-
al is available.
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The IBM-360 complex has been traditionally committed to near real-time
and real-time support of manned spaceflight missions. Relaxation from this
status is evident from the recent implementation of the Mission Operations
Planning System (MOPS) which provides an interactive mission planning
capability further upstream in the mission development cycle than ever be-
fore. Recent MSC sponsored studies by IBM and Computer Sciences Corpora-
tion point to a sophisticated information management system in the future.
It is anticipated that these complexes will eventually merge, either
with software providing the interface or with a new set of integrating
hardware. In addition, somewhere along this path an interactive graphics
capability will be made available to the majority of the data user popu-
lation. Automation of operational data would probably be constrained to
start with the 1106/1108 information retrieval capability and a limited
(in terms of the quantity of terminals available) time share/terminal capa-
bility, and then increase in consonance with expansion of the automation
capabilities of MSC. The flexibility to take advantage of these expanded
capabilities should therefore be included in any plan for automation of
operational data.
The characteristics of operational data encompass the entire range
of possible data characteristics in any technical area. Operational data
include drawings, graphs, tabular data, and short and long text. The
graphical, tabular, and short text data are the most dynamic in terms of
update frequency, and the data management system would benefit most from
the automation of these data types. Long text is usually descriptive in
nature and does not require frequent change, while drawings are considered
relatively invariant.
In view of the progressively increasing automation capabilities
anticipated and the broad spectrum of data characteristics comprising
operational data, it appears that a cost-effective operational data manage-
ment system would be achieved by:
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1) Structuring the entire operational data population for indexing
through a central source and automating a data reference file
at the beginning of a program. This would serve to consolidate
the identification, status, and location of data and would soon
become recognized as the primary source for operational data.
2) Structuring the more dynamic data (in terms of update frequency)
into the automated data base. Key data users would be provided
with terminal access (on a single "ques tion and answer" basis)
to that data which changes frequently. Data validators would
have coded access for validation purposes. This would alleviate
the search and update complexity encountered with large amounts
of frequently changing paper. Graphical data which are not easily
automated for widespread use at present, would be present in
tabular format during the near-term. The user would have to plot
his own graphs or have them plotted by use of his own batch or
on-line plot program. Either of these alternatives is easily
accomplished and is not considered a severe system constraint.
3) Structuring the remainder of the data into a manual or semi-
automated set of files indexed to conform with the data reference
file described above. This would complete the integrated data
base set.
4) Providing a capability to maintain the entire integrated data
base set and to handle new data requirements. At any point in
time, the advisability of automating additional data would be
assessed in terms of the available automation capabilities and
experience with the automated part of the system. As both capa-
bilities and experience increase, more and more data would be
automated. Thus the undesirable features of a manual system de-
scribed in previous paragraphs would be progressively eliminated.
5) Publishing operational data to satisfy the large number of users
who would not have convenient access to terminals and who do not
require short update response times. Data contained in the auto-
mated data base could be processed by direct computer printout
and greatly alleviate the manual processing load.
6) Prioritizing assignment of the limited quantity of teletype ter-
minals presently available, reflecting the needs of both opera-
rional data users for a given program and the needs of other
terminal users for other programs. These priority decisions
would undoubtedly be made by center-level management.
The advantages of this phased approach to automation at the beginning
of a program contrast favorably with the alternative of planning only for
a manual system and then proceeding to automation when the need becomes
critical. They include:
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1) The long exposure period necessary for widespread acceptance of
any system would commence upon implementation of management policy,
thus facilitating earlier operational effectivity.
2) The costly and confusing impact of changing some of the operations
and roles of the data management system participants downstream
in the program would be avoided (e.g., contract changes).
3) The probable need to restructure manual data files to accommodate
automation would be avoided. If the structuring of data files
for automation is delayed, then when it does occur, the program
impact will include start-up delays and widespread confusion about
which data are available, and what data are valid.
While the above approach is deemed cost-effective when applied to
spacecraft operational data alone, it would be more cost-effective from an
overall program standpoint if the data spectrum were expanded to include
consideration of all technical data of the program.
Operational data are extracted from gross estimates, technical require-
ments and initial versions of end item specifications during the early seg-
ment of a spacecraft program. As detailed analyses, performance models and
development tests begin to occur, operational data are then progressively
updated to reflect later knowledge, and finally during the operational phase
of a program, these data are updated to reflect operational experience.
Thus while operational data have not been the major product of any function
during any phase of the program, they have been a minor product of a major-
ity of the functions throughout the definition, design, development and
operational phases. In essence, a portion of the data generated by these
functions during each of these phases is operational data.
Since spacecraft operational data are so interwoven with much of the
technical data of a program, the above arguments in favor of phased and
planned-from-the-beginning automation also appear to be applicable to
automation of all technical data. In addition, consideration of all
technical data would enhance retention of the close coupling between opera-
tional data and the other technical data of a program reflected in the
requirements of Section 3.
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Additional benefits would be realized. Traditionally, program offices
are responsible for maintaining a reasonable balance between program costs,
schedules, and performance, and must detect and be responsive to unbalancing
forces; this responsiblity is shared to varying extents with functional
management. Information necessary to perform this function is derived in
part from technical data in a manner similar to operational data. Auto-
mation of all technical data (initially through development of reference
files) would facilitate the correlation and extraction of the data necessary
to provide management visibility.
The above described benefits of automation appear to be of overwhelm-
ing value to both the data management and program management efforts of
future programs. For this reason it is recommended that the phased approach
recommended above for operational data be widened in scope and applied to
the development of an overall program information management system.
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6. DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL DATA REQUIREMENTS
Ideally all data requirements for a program would be known at the
beginning of the program and would be specified explicitly in the initial
contract. To a considerable and probably acceptable degree, this can be
done for most spacecraft data since requirements, data management pro-
cesses, and program management methods have matured from experience. How-
ever, this does not appear to be the case for spacecraft operational data
and shows up in the form of IItime paradoxes ll mentioned in Section 4.
Examples are: the operational data user invariably recognizes additional
data requirements at the conclusion of the development process, while the
opportunity to satisfy these requirements occurs earlier in the development
process; the mission planner's data requirements depend on hardware con-
figurations, yet he is asked to supply definitive inputs to assist in
selection of those same hardware configurations; even in preparing con-
tracts, the operational data user is asked years in advance to define his
requirements for data about systems not yet conceived. Possibly the most
serious consequence of these paradoxes comes from those instances where
data are irretrievably lost because an obvious need does not develop until
after the acquisition opportunity has passed. We believe the solution to
this problem is the system engineering function which relates hardware
development to eventual operational employment.
The operational data user must be represented in the hardware develop-
ment process to resolve the paradoxes above, but his data problem is only
a part of this system engineering function. The total job requires con-
tinual interplay between the operations world and the hardware develop-
ment world to produce an effective spacecraft system - i.e., continual
iteration between operations analysis and hardware design. By maintaining
an awareness of the operational data users I needs and expanding and refin-
ing their stated requirements, the user can be supplied with the IIbest ll
available data and planning can be maintained to improve the data as future
development and test activities permit. At any given time, a user's need
in the far future will be specified now for acquisition and storage in the
intermediate future. The user's representative in this process must
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function from a base of experience acquired on a previous program and have
sufficient training and maturity to exercise good engineering and program
management judgement. The above system engineering activity suggests an
Operations Analysis Group which might work along the lines of the Apollo
Data Priority Group, but which would start at the beginning of the program.
Further exploration of this subject is beyond the objectives of this study.
Several recommendations are made for alleviating the operational data
problem along a line compatible with the above. First, where requirements
are known, they should be included in the prime contract RFP through DRL's
and DRD's in conformance with current contracting practice. Second, those
DRL's and DRD's should be coordinated on a program-wide basis to allow
integration of requirements for operational data. Third, to assist in
developing data requirements before contracts are firmed up, a technique
such as that illustrated in Figure 3 is suggested.
This technique causes the time-phased functional activities to be re-
lated to their necessary input and output data needs. In the diagram, the
black dots identify the activities for which the data items serve as input.
That part of the diagram below the "MSC Data Base" would be largely a MSC
activity while the upper part would be primarily a contractor responsibility.
An example of both sections of the diagram would be included with the RFP.
As a part of his proposal, the contractor would be expected to respond
with a version reflecting his spacecraft development plan. This version,
when negotiated, would be included by the NASA program office in an overall
program data function diagram. Although complex and highly interrelated,
the diagram would form the basis for the entire program data plan and
structure of an automated data base. While difficult to maintain manually,
elements of the diagram could easily be handled by an automated IMS with
correlative features. As a result of this exercise in the RFP/Proposal
stage, additional firm data requirements could be included in the contract.
The common desire among operational data users for early and continual
"best data" inputs deserves specific attention, since it affects the data
management system discipline and apparent integrity. Operational data
sources are reluctant to "formally" supply estimates which have limited
"provabil i ty. II Contractor management i nhi bits the submi ss i on of estimated
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Fi gure 3. Sample Data-Function Diagram for
Spacecraft Subsystem Development
~
data which may later prove contradictory to the data eventually produced
by the design, development, control and acceptance activities. The above
conflicts are not completely resolved on the Apollo or Skylab programs.
The following solution is recommended:
1) The contract statement of work would provide for joint
MSCjcontractor estimates of expected spacecraft perfor-
mance. It would limit contractor accountability to
furnishing conscientious estimates by those contractor
personnel best qualified to make such technical judge-
ments, and specify that such estimates would have no
contractual significance.
2) The early data estimates, together with the basis for
the estimates, would be placed in the automated data
base of the IMS and keyed to trigger reassessment and
reconfirmation of their validity at short-time intervals.
This would serve to assure that an early estimate would
not continue to drive program functions after it had
become obsolete.
To cover the unforeseen need for data after a contract is initiated,
some Level of Effort (LOE) of a call contract nature should be included in
the basic prime contract. The amount of the LOE needed might be estimated
as some percentage of the effort spent on known data requirements.
24
